Entrepreneurship and the Barrier to Exit: How Does an Entrepreneur-Friendly Bankruptcy Law Affect Entrepreneurship Development at a Societal Level? by Seung-Hyun Lee et al.
  
 
Entrepreneurship and the Barrier to Exit: 
How Does an Entrepreneur-Friendly 
Bankruptcy Law Affect Entrepreneurship 
Development at a Societal Level?   
 
 




Seung-Hyun Lee, Yasuhiro Yamakawa, Mike W. Peng  









Under contract no. SBAHQ-06-M-0536 
 
 
Release Date: June 2008 
  
 
This report was developed under a contract with the Small Business Administration, Office of 
Advocacy, and contains information and analysis that was reviewed and edited by officials of the 
Office of Advocacy. However, the final conclusions of the report do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Office of Advocacy. Entrepreneurship and the Barrier to Exit: 
How Does an Entrepreneur-Friendly Bankruptcy Law Affect 
Entrepreneurship Development at a Societal Level?
by Seung-Hyun Lee, Yasuhiro Yamakawa, and Mike W. Peng of the University of Texas at Dallas under 
contract no. SBAHQ-06-M-0536 to the Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference for the Award. 
2008. [18] pages.
This report was developed under a contract with the Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, and contains information 
and analysis that was reviewed and edited by officials of the Office of Advocacy. However, the final conclusions of the report do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Advocacy.
Introduction
This paper was originally presented in Madrid, 
Spain, at the Babson College Entrepreneurship 
Research Conference (BCERC) in June 2007. It 
was awarded the Office of Advocacy Best Paper 
Award at the 2008 BCERC meetings in Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina. 
Seung-Hyun Lee is an Assistant Professor 
of Organizations, Strategy & International 
Management in the School of Management 
at the University of Texas at Dallas, Yasuhiro 
Yamakawa is a Ph.D. Student in the School of 
Management at the University of Texas at Dallas, 
and Mike W. Peng is Provost’s Distinguished 
Professor of Global Strategy in the School of 
Management at the University of Texas at Dallas.
Purpose
How a society’s formal institutions, such as bank-
ruptcy laws, govern bankrupt entrepreneurs and 
firms is an important component of the institu-
tional framework within which entrepreneurs and 
firms operate. The legal procedures associated 
with bankruptcy vary significantly across coun-
tries. Some countries provide only limited protec-
tion for entrepreneurs and managers of bankrupt 
firms, while others have a more entrepreneur-
friendly bankruptcy law. Overall, whether the 
institutional framework encourages or discourages 
entrepreneurship may determine a society’s long-
run economic performance.
The authors examine the relationship between 
bankruptcy law and the value-creating activities in 
a society associated with risk-taking behaviors by 
entrepreneurial firms. They argue that an entre-
preneur-friendly bankruptcy law may increase the 
number of corporate bankruptcies, which may be 
indicative of a vibrant entrepreneurial economy.
This paper tests hypotheses relating to seven 
key aspects of bankruptcy laws using a longitudi-
nal database covering 35 countries and spanning 
10 years. 
Overall Findings
The authors find that a lenient, entrepreneur-
friendly bankruptcy law encourages entrepreneurs 
to take risks and thus lets entrepreneurship pros-
per. This risk-taking can generate variety in the 
economy by increasing the number of firms with 
high growth potential, which may lead to more 
entrepreneurship and economic development—in 
short, failure may be good for the economy. The 
study pushes for a more informed understanding 
of how formal institutions governing bankruptcy 
matter for entrepreneurial behavior and outcomes. 
It emphasizes that a society that is not willing 
to absorb the “pain” of having a large number 
of entrepreneurial failures, via an entrepreneur-
friendly bankruptcy law, is not likely to reap the 
“gain” of vibrant entrepreneurship development 
and economic growth. 
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 Highlights
The study analyzes seven components of an entrepre-
neur-friendly bankruptcy law and finds:
• The availability of reorganization procedures 
as a choice for bankrupt firms encourages bank-
ruptcy filings.
• Less time and less cost associated with a 
bankruptcy proceeding encourages entrepreneurs 
to file for bankruptcy and is consistent with high-
er filing rates in a country.
• The more resources entrepreneurs recover 
from bankruptcy—which would mean a fresher 
start—the higher the filing rate in a country.
• An automatic stay on assets is likely to 
encourage entrepreneurs to file bankruptcy.
• The protection of creditors at the time of 
bankruptcy leads to a higher rate of bankruptcy 
filing.
• One result appears contradictory—that is, 
allowing incumbent managers to stay on the job 
does not lead to a higher rate of bankruptcy. 
Rather, management turnover leads to an increase 
in filing. More capable managers may have moved 
elsewhere.
Note
This paper was prepared for presentation at 
the Babson College Entrepreneurship Research 
Conference. The report references “space limita-
tions” and “suppressed” control variables in the 
tables. The authors needed to comply with strict 
guidelines for submission to the BCERC, includ-
ing a page limitation. The Office of Advocacy 
is releasing as a working paper the BCERC ver-
sion of the paper, which adheres to these guide-
lines. This research was supported, in part, by a 
National Science Foundation (NSF) CAREER 
grant (SES 0552089) to Mike W. Peng. The views 
expressed are those of the authors and not nec-
essarily those of the NSF or the SBA Office of 
Advocacy.
Scope and Methodology
The authors collected data for 35 countries dur-
ing the 10 years 1990-1999 (inclusive). Data were 
drawn from commercial bankruptcy filings, legal 
rules, and other data from the World Bank, the 
World Health Organization (WHO), and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Analysis of reorganization procedures is based 
on bankruptcy data from government and private 
sources. Data on closing time, closing cost, and 
fresh start (measured by rate of recovery from 
a closing) were obtained from the World Bank. 
Data on legal rules covering protection of corpo-
rate shareholders and creditors, their origin, and 
the quality of their enforcement and on the regu-
lation of entry are gathered from past studies.
The authors test hypotheses that predict how 
various components of bankruptcy law can cur-
tail the downside risk of entrepreneurs and help 
encourage risk-taking behavior such as filing for 
bankruptcy. A log-linear model is used to model 
the changes in bankruptcy filings. The dependent 
variable is the bankruptcy rate—the ratio of the 
number of bankruptcies to the total number of 
firms—and is allowed to take both positive and 
negative values rather than being constrained to 
be positive. The model controls for four major fac-
tors: (1) the previous year’s number of bankrupt-
cies for each country, (2) regional effects, (3) pos-
sible time effects across all countries, and (4) one 
social dimension of bankruptcy law that reflects 
the level of social stigma concerning failure and is 
measured by the suicide rate.
This report was peer-reviewed consistent with 
Advocacy’s data quality guidelines. More informa-
tion on this process can be obtained by contact-
ing the director of economic research by email at 
advocacy@sba.gov or by phone at (202) 205-6533.
Ordering Information
The full text of this report and summaries of other 
studies performed under contract with the U.S. 
Small Business Administration's Office of Advocacy 
are available on the Internet at www.sba.gov/advo/
research. Copies are available for purchase from:
National Technical Information Service
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
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ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE BARRIER TO EXIT:   
HOW DOES AN ENTREPRENEUR-FRIENDLY BANKRUPTCY LAW   
AFFECT ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT AT A SOCIETAL LEVEL? 
∗ 
  
Seung-Hyun Lee, Yasuhiro Yamakawa, Mike W. Peng 
University of Texas at Dallas 
 
  ABSTRACT 
 
Does an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law encourage more entrepreneurship development at a societal 
level? How does bankruptcy law affect entrepreneurship development around the world? Drawing on a 
real options perspective, we argue that if bankrupt entrepreneurs are excessively punished for failure, they 
may pass potentially high-return but inherently high-risk opportunities. Amassing a longitudinal, 
cross-country data base from 35 countries spanning ten years, we find that a lenient, entrepreneur-friendly 
bankruptcy law encourages entrepreneurs to take risks and thus let entrepreneurship prosper. Components 
of an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law are: (1) the availability of a reorganization bankruptcy option, 
(2) the time spent on bankruptcy procedure, (3) the cost of bankruptcy procedure, (4) the opportunity to 
have a fresh start in liquidation bankruptcy, (5) the opportunity to have an automatic stay of assets, (6) the 
opportunity for managers to remain on the job after filing for bankruptcy, and (7) the protection of 




Corporate bankruptcies are common. During the 1990s, the annual average number of corporate 
bankruptcies in Japan was 14,500; in Germany it was 21,000; and in Great Britain, it was 47,000 
(Claessens & Klapper, 2005; Industry Week, 1998). In 2001, 38,540 businesses in the United States 
declared bankruptcy (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2003). While many large firms also declare 
bankruptcy, a majority of bankrupt firms are small, entrepreneurial firms (Warren & Westbrook, 1999; 
White, 1990). In other words, while every entrepreneur is interested in success, unfortunately, a majority 
of smaller, entrepreneurial firms may end up in bankruptcy (Knott & Posen, 2005).   
 
How formal institutions of a society, such as bankruptcy law, govern bankrupt entrepreneurs and firms 
is an important component of the institutional framework within which entrepreneurs and firms operate 
(North, 1990; Peng, 2003). The legal procedures associated with bankruptcy vary significantly across 
countries (Alexopoulos & Domowitz, 1998; Claessens & Klapper, 2005). Some countries provide only 
limited protection for entrepreneurs and managers of bankrupt firms. Other countries have a more 
entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law. A well-known proposition in the literature is that institutions 
matter—more specifically, entrepreneurs and firms strategically respond to the institutional incentives and 
disincentives (Oliver, 1991; Peng et al., 2005). In the aggregate, how the institutional framework 
encourages or discourages entrepreneurship development at the societal level may determine the long-run 
economic performance of any society (North, 1990).     
 
Given the “institutions matter” proposition, more work is needed to help us understand: How do 
institutions matter? Thus, two important but unexplored questions are: How does bankruptcy law affect 
entrepreneurship development around the world? Does an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law 
encourage more entrepreneurship development at a societal level? Recently, Lee, Peng, and Barney 
(2007), using a real options logic, theoretically argue that an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law may 
curtail downside losses of entrepreneurial failures and facilitate upside gains at the societal level. In other 
                                                 
∗ This research was supported, in part, by a National Science Foundation CAREER grant (SES 0552089) to Peng. The views 
expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the NSF. 
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 2   
words, an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law lowers exit barriers, by imposing relatively less painful 
bankruptcy procedures. It also reduces entry barriers, by reducing the cost of business failure and thus 
facilitating more entrepreneurial entries. In the aggregate, an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law may 
enhance the variance and the value of the bundle of productive assets within an economy, which can be 
viewed as a bundle of real options from a societal level. While innovative, the conceptual nature of Lee et 
al. (2007) thus calls for further theoretical development and empirical exploration. In response, to 
partially fill the gap in this stream of research, we theoretically build on these arguments and empirically 
test whether a lenient, entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law indeed encourages entrepreneurial 
risk-taking.  
 
Amassing a longitudinal, cross-country database covering 35 countries and spanning ten years 
(1990-99, inclusive), we examine the relationship between bankruptcy law and the value creating 
activities in a society associated with risk-taking behaviors by entrepreneurial firms. Here, we define 
entrepreneurs as individuals who combine resources in new and risky ways and have the potential to add 
value to society through these endeavors (Schumpeter, 1942). Lee et al. (2007: 268) argue that an 
entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law may paradoxically increase the number of corporate bankruptcies, 
which may be indicative of vibrant entrepreneurial activities in an economy. Therefore, we focus on 
whether differences in the bankruptcy law indeed are systematically related to the different levels of 
bankruptcy filing around the world. Following Lee et al. (2007), we argue that real options theory is well 
adapted to this endeavor since bankruptcy law determines the downside risk associated with risky 
behavior of entrepreneurs, while the upside potential of these risky behaviors is potentially unlimited. 
This is the ideal backdrop within which real options logic can be useful (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).   
 
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT 
  
How can an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law encourage entrepreneurship development? 
Developing the arguments on bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship development based on the real options 
perspective in Lee et al. (2007), we hypothesize that the following aspects of bankruptcy laws would 
encourage more risk-taking by facilitating a higher rate of bankruptcy filing: (1) the availability of a 
reorganization bankruptcy option, (2) the time spent on bankruptcy procedure, (3) the cost of bankruptcy 
procedure, (4) the opportunity to have a fresh start in liquidation bankruptcy, (5) the opportunity to have 
an automatic stay of assets, (6) the opportunity for managers to remain on the job after filing for 
bankruptcy, and (7) the protection of creditors at the time of bankruptcy. 
 
Availability of a Reorganization Bankruptcy Option 
 
For firms in financial difficulty, there are three possible ways to approach bankruptcy: out-of-court 
settlement, reorganization bankruptcy (which is called Chapter 11 in the United States), and liquidation 
bankruptcy (which is called Chapter 7 in the United States). Since it is significantly less expensive than 
in-court reorganization, out-of-court settlement is usually the first among firms (Franks & Torous, 1994). 
Between the latter two, however, U.S. firms often prefer Chapter 11. The reason is filing Chapter 11 
offers one more chance to revive from financial distress (Lynn & Neyland, 1992). From a real options 
perspective, having a chance to file reorganization bankruptcy gives firms more options (Lee et al., 2007). 
This may increase the variance of types of firms in a society. During this term of bankruptcy protection, 
restructuring may enable some firms, which may be in temporary financial difficulty, to eventually get 
out of trouble and thrive. This is why filing reorganization bankruptcy is considered as one of the strategic 
options for many firms under financial difficulty (Flynn & Farid, 1991). Not all countries, however, have 
all three ways of resolving financial distress. For instance, many countries in Eastern Europe did not have 
adequate bankruptcy law when they decided to change their economic regime from planned to market. In 
a country where reorganization bankruptcy is not available, firms’ options are reduced to either 
out-of-court settlement or liquidation bankruptcy. The possible future variety may be reduced at the 3   
societal level if firms undergoing financial distress are forced to liquidate with no opportunity to 
restructure. From a real options perspective, providing opportunities to reorganize for bankrupt firms give 
more options for a society at large. This is why Miller (1977) argues that the reorganization bankruptcy 
option can be considered a “call option.” Since it is uncertain if a firm has a positive future, providing an 
opportunity to prove it is an invaluable vehicle for creating options value at the societal level. 
Shareholders would benefit if reorganization succeeds and can walk away should reorganization fail. On 
the other hand, should the only form of bankruptcy is liquidation bankruptcy entrepreneurs have an 
incentive to delay bankruptcy filing as long as possible since that may mean it is the end of the game 
(White, 1994). Thus:   
Hypothesis 1: The availability of reorganization bankruptcy as a choice for bankrupt 
firms will be associated with a higher rate of bankruptcy filing in a country. 
 
Time Spent on Bankruptcy Procedure 
 
The cost of bankruptcy is also positively related to the length of time spent on the bankruptcy 
procedure (Bebchuk, 2000). In a liquidation bankruptcy, a fast procedure would allow quick reallocation 
of assets of failed firms to better users. At the same time, a fast procedure can provide an entrepreneur a 
new opportunity to start over a business. By eliminating failing firms and reallocating resources to better 
uses, a fast bankruptcy procedure may increase variance in a bundle of firms at a societal level. If a firm 
files reorganization bankruptcy, a fast procedure may protect the value of the assets of the firm and 
improve its chance for a successful turnaround (Bebchuk, 2000). A lengthy process characterized by an 
uncertain outcome, however, may make business partners (such as buyers and sellers) reluctant to 
maintain their business relationships. This in turn may reduce earnings and the value of firm assets 
(LoPucki & Doherty, 2002). Managers are likely to become frustrated with the long procedure, which 
distracts them from focusing on more important operations. An inefficient, time-consuming procedure 
may end up forcing a firm to liquidate by increasing financial distress while a fast procedure could have 
saved the firm. For example, in Japan, even when financially insolvent firms decide to file for bankruptcy, 
courts will scrutinize the case and decide whether to allow certain firms to declare themselves bankrupt. 
In other words, some insolvent firms are not allowed to bankrupt. This procedure alone takes more than 
three months (Alexander, 1999). It is, therefore, not surprising that in Japan, half of all liquidations took 
more than three years and more than 75% of reorganizations exceeded five years from application to 
conclusion (Alexander, 1999). Overall, a more efficient bankruptcy procedure may encourage failing 
firms to file bankruptcy. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: Less time spent on the bankruptcy procedure will be associated with a 
higher rate of bankruptcy filing in a country. 
 
Cost of Bankruptcy Procedure 
 
It is not only lengthy time that would make entrepreneurs to procrastinate about filing bankruptcy, but 
also the actual cost involved in filing bankruptcy. One may think that the direct cost of bankruptcy is not 
very high. However, James (1991) finds that it is around 10 percent of the assets of the firms filing 
bankruptcy in banking industry in the United Sates. He further observes that if indirect cost of bankruptcy 
such as loss of the asset value, it mounts to 30 percent. However, when we look at the cost of bankruptcy 
internationally, 10 percent is not a high percentage. For example, as a percentage of the assets of the firm 
filing bankruptcy, it costs 22 percent of the assets when a firm files bankruptcy in Poland while it is only 
7 percent in the U.S. (Doing Business Report 2006). This is why Mason (2005: 1523) argues that costly 
bankruptcy “can sluggish economic growth.” In other words, high bankruptcy cost may provide 
incentives for the firms to delay filing bankruptcies even when it is more valuable to go bankrupt at the 
societal level. Thus, we argue; 
Hypothesis 3: Less cost spent on the bankruptcy procedure will be associated with a 
higher rate of bankruptcy filing in a country. 4   
 
 
Fresh Start in Liquidation Bankruptcy 
 
Bankruptcy law can be either discharging the bankrupt individuals from a debt or allowing the pursuit 
of the bankrupt entrepreneurs for years (OECD, 1998). By simply discharging the bankrupt entrepreneurs, 
while creditors can claim residual assets, creditors cannot pursue for any remaining claims which have not 
been met as is the case in the United States. Since future earnings are exempt from the obligations to 
repay past debt from bankruptcy, this is named a “fresh start” (White, 2001). In the absence of a legally 
protected “fresh start,” creditors can pursue any remaining claims. For instance, in Germany, the debtor 
remains liable for unpaid debt for up to 30 years and creditors can go beyond claiming residual assets 
(Ziechmann, 1997: 12-25). German managers at bankrupt firms can also be personally liable for criminal 
penalties (Fialski, 1994). From a real options perspective, it is not surprising that such differences in 
limiting downside losses can make a huge difference in the risk-taking propensity between American and 
German entrepreneurs. In addition, the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis revealed that little protection 
against creditors actually kept many firms from filing bankruptcy even when it would have made more 
sense to file a bankruptcy (New York Times, 1998). For executives of the firms in distress who know that 
the consequences would hurt them personally such as ruining their reputation and inviting possible 
criminal law suit following the bankruptcy filing, filing a bankruptcy is likely to be the last thing they 
would have in mind. This means that many firms that should not be alive continued to survive at a huge 
cost to the overall value of the bundle of firms in a country. Thus: 
Hypothesis 4: Discharging bankrupt entrepreneurs more from debt to allow them to have 
a “fresh start” will be associated with a higher rate of bankruptcy filing in a country. 
 
Automatic Stay of Assets in Reorganization Bankruptcy 
 
In some countries a bankruptcy law may come with an automatic stay of assets and discharge some 
portion of debt. An automatic stay upon the start of bankruptcy proceedings means that creditors must 
cease debt collection efforts and move claims to the court (Alexopoulos & Domowitz, 1998). The firm 
would be in operation while creditors and firms negotiate (Kaiser, 1996). Before deciding whether the 
firm should be liquidated or not, an automatic stay allows time for mangers to communicate with 
creditors (Franks et al., 1996). La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) find that nearly 
half of the 49 countries they study do not have an automatic stay on assets. For example, in the United 
States, bankruptcy law stipulates automatic stay in the case of reorganization bankruptcy. On the other 
hand, countries such as Germany, Great Britain, and Japan do not guarantee automatic stay of assets 
(Alexander, 1999; Hashi, 1997). In an economy where secured creditors are allowed to repossess their 
assets when a firm files reorganization bankruptcy, it can end up in premature liquidations. Given 
uncertainty over the future potential of the firm, even when the value of the ongoing concern is higher 
than liquidation value, creditors may have a greater interest in liquidating the firm (Wruck, 1990). In 
Germany, for example, automatic stay does not extend to secured creditors and these secured creditors 
have incentives to go with liquidation bankruptcy (Kaiser, 1996). Therefore, when automatic stay is not in 
place, many firms do not have the opportunity to file a reorganization bankruptcy even when this option is 
legally allowed. Thus:   
Hypothesis 5: An automatic stay of assets specified by a bankruptcy law will be 
associated with a higher rate of bankruptcy filing in a country. 
 
The Fate of Managers 
 
Managers make firm-specific investments during their tenure with a firm. This firm-specific knowledge 
would be most required when a firm is in financial distress. However, the opportunity to stay with the 
firm after filing for reorganization bankruptcy provides incentives for managers to make firm-specific 5   
investments. In this sense, if managers are going to be driven out when a firm files reorganization 
bankruptcy, they may lack incentives to make firm-specific investments in the first place (Shleifer & 
Summers, 1988). If managers know ex ante that they will not be automatically replaced in the case of 
bankruptcy filing, however, the opportunity to stay with the firm thus works as a “bonding device” 
(Gaston, 1997). Therefore, when a firm files bankruptcy, providing an opportunity for managers to stay 
may provide managers a better chance to revive the firm. As firms can be heterogeneous, firm-specific 
investments by managers would increase variety and value in a bundle of firms (Barney, 1991). On the 
other hand, in a manager-replacement system such as a trustee-appointment system, appointing outsiders 
without firm-specific knowledge for reorganization may not lead to proper reorganization (Alexander, 
1999; Franks et al., 1996; Hashi, 1997). For example, Chapter 11 in the United States allows managers of 
a firm filing bankruptcy to retain control of the firm and provides managers the exclusive right to propose 
reorganization plans. In contrast, in Great Britain and Germany, control rights are rendered to secured 
creditors (Franks et al., 1996). It is not surprising that the practice of allowing secured creditors to take 
over has been criticized for leading to premature liquidation (Kaiser, 1996). Overall: 
Hypothesis 6: Allowing incumbent managers to stay on the job specified by a bankruptcy 
law rather than forcing out incumbent managers will be associated with a higher rate of 
bankruptcy filing in a country. 
 
Protection of Creditors at the Time of Bankruptcy 
 
In the absence of bankruptcy law pertaining to coordination among creditors, private debt collection 
efforts would end up in an ad hoc disposition of debts on a first-come first-served basis (Jackson, 1986; 
Longhofer & Peters, 2004). Should coordination among creditors not be specified ex ante, it is very likely 
that creditors would rush to collect the debt from the firms in distress. In other words, when coordination 
among creditors is not specified ex ante, “the first creditors to take action against the firm will be the first 
to obtain relief” and “later creditors will gain possession of whatever assets remain, if any. Once a firm 
becomes insolvent each creditor is on its own to collect what it is owed and will care little how its actions 
might affect the firm’s other creditors” (Longhofer & Peters, 2004; 257). In this sense, specifying 
coordination among creditors ex ante provides creditors a way to impose a collective and compulsory 
action on firms, which would prevent dissipation of the asset value of a firm in financial distress (Jackson, 
1986). Even if creditors can coordinate ex post, the cost of coordination of distributing remaining assets 
would be exceedingly high, which would dramatically decrease the salvage value of a firm when it files a 
bankruptcy (Jackson, 1986; Longhofer & Peters, 2004). This is why past research finds that bankruptcy 
law is designed to cope with the common pool problem arising when a firm with multiple creditors 
becomes insolvent, which increases the size of the pie to be distributed among creditors (Baird, 1987; 
Jackson, 1986; Picker, 1992; White; 1990). Given the reasons mentioned above, entrepreneurs would be 
taking little risk should coordination among creditors are not specified ext ante. In addition, even those 
firms that are already in business would consider filing bankruptcy as the last option (Claessens & 
Klapper, 2005). This is because, in the absence of due coordination among creditors, filing bankruptcy 
would be a signal of insolvency, which would provide incentives for the creditors to rush on collecting 
their debts. If this happens, even though it might increase the salvage value for the first creditor to claim 
the debt from the firms in distress, those firms otherwise would be viable may be forced to cease 
operation, which in turn would decrease the total value at the societal level.   
Hypothesis 7: Protection of creditors at the time of bankruptcy will be associated with a 
higher rate of bankruptcy filing in a country. 
 
Overall, informed by a real options perspective, an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law may facilitate 
entrepreneurship development at the societal level by encouraging more risk-taking through curtailing 
downside risks for failed entrepreneurs and their firms and through more enthusiastic creation of new 
firms (Efrat, 2002).   





We have collected data for 35 countries during the ten years 1990-1999 (inclusive). Our sources 
include past studies on commercial bankruptcy filings collected from government and private sources 
(Claessens & Klapper, 2005); on the legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and 
creditors, their origin, and the quality of their enforcement (La Porta et al., 1998); and on the regulation of 
entry (Djankov et al., 2002). We have also collected additional data from sources such as the World Bank, 
the World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Table 1 outlines the 
main differences across the 35 countries. 
 
[ Insert Table 1 about here ] 
 
Reorganization procedure. We use bankruptcy data provided by Claessens and Klapper (2002, 2005) 
which are obtained from government and private sources (see Appendix 1). This variable equals to 1 if 
there is a legalized reorganization procedure; and 0 otherwise. The majority of the countries, but not all, 
have formal reorganization laws.   
 
Closing time. As suggested by Claessens and Klapper (2005), the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank document detailed features of bankruptcy systems in 
many countries. The data on closing time was obtained from the World Bank.
1  Closing time refers to the 
average time (in years) to complete a bankruptcy procedure within a country. Since we argue that taking 
shorter time for bankruptcy procedure is associated with higher filing rate, we reversed the signs of the 
lengths of time from positive to negative.   
 
Closing cost. Similarly, we use data provided by the World Bank to measure the costs associated with 
bankruptcy filings. Closing cost represents the cost (% of estate) of the bankruptcy proceedings. Again, in 
order to align with our argument that lower cost of bankruptcy is associated with higher filing rate, we 
reversed the signs from positive to negative.   
 
Fresh start. We use the rate of recovery from a closing to measure the degree of an entrepreneur’s fresh 
start as provided and specified by the bankruptcy law. Since the likelihood of pursuits of remaining 
claims is associated with closing recovery, we use this variable to proxy for an entrepreneur’s fresh start. 
Closing recovery exhibits the recovery rate, which calculates how many cents on the dollar claimants 
such as creditors, tax authorities, and employees recover from an insolvent firm. We assume that the 
greater the claimants recover from an insolvent firm, the less recovered by entrepreneurs themselves, 
thereby less likely they will have a fresher start. As above, in order to align with our argument that lower 
recovery by others is associated with higher filing rate, we calculated fresh start as one dollar (100 cents) 
minus the rate of recovery as cents per dollar by others such as creditors, tax authorities, and employees. 
Data for this variable are also obtained from the World Bank.   
 
Automatic stay of assets. We use data originally collected by La Porta et al. (1998) and frequently used 
in subsequent research (e.g., Claessens & Klapper, 2005; Pistor, 2000). This variable represents one of the 
four dummy variables created in La Porta et al. (1998) to constitute an “index of creditor rights”—noted 
here as “automatic stay of assets.” Accordingly, this variable equals to 1 if there is automatic stay of 
assets; and 0 otherwise (i.e., no moratorium on payments).   
 
                                                 
1  Doing Business Report 2006, International Finance Corporation, The World Bank Group (http://www.ifc.org/) 7   
Stay of incumbent management. This variable also refers to one of the dummy variables that constitute 
La Porta et al.’s (1998) index of creditor rights—what they label as, “management does not 
stay”—labeled here as “stay of incumbent management.” Accordingly, the variable equals to 1 if 
incumbent management stays during a restructuring or bankruptcy; and 0 otherwise (i.e., when an official 
appointed by the court or by the creditors is responsible for the operation of the business during 
reorganization, or when the debtor does not keep the administration of its property pending the resolution 
of the process).   
 
Protection of creditors at the time of bankruptcy. Similarly, we use the variable “secured creditors first” 
provided by La Porta et al. (1998) noted here as “protection of creditors.” Accordingly, the variable 
equals to 1 if secured creditors have the highest priority in payment (i.e., distribution of the proceeds that 
result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm); and 0 otherwise. We use this variable to 
proxy for whether coordination among creditors is specified ex ante. In other words, when secured 
creditors have highest priority and the better the claims be satisfied and legally settled under the 
bankruptcy law, the less dissipation of assets would occur (Jackson, 1986; Longhofer & Peters, 2004).     
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. In order to capture any possible 
multicollinearity problems associated with high correlation, we checked all variance-inflation factors 
(VIF), tolerance, and condition indexes. While individual VIFs greater than 10, the average VIF greater 
than 6, and the individual tolerance less than 0.1 are generally seen as indicative of severe 
multicollinearity, the maximum VIF was 5, the mean VIF being 3, and none of the tolerance were less 
than 0.1, respectively, suggesting little problem of multicollinearity.   
 
[ Insert Table 2 about here ] 
 
Dependent Variable and Model Specification 
 
In our hypotheses, we predict how various components of the bankruptcy law can curtail the downside 
risk of entrepreneurs and help encourage risk-taking behavior such as filing bankruptcy. The dependent 
variable in our model is thus the bankruptcy rate—the ratio of the number of bankruptcies to the total 
number of firms. We use Claessens and Klapper’s (2005) data on the sum of all firms that file for 
bankruptcy—measuring the total use of the bankruptcy law and the judicial system to resolve corporate 
financial distress—normalized by the number of firms as provided by Djankov et al.’s (2002) and the 
official country statistical handbooks. We model the change rate of bankruptcy filings using the following 
power function:   
BRi, t = BR
a
it-1 exp (γRPit-1 + ζCTit-1 + ηCCit-1 + θRRit-1 + ιSAit-1 + κMSit-1 + λPCit-1 + βC it-1)   (I) 
 
Here, BRit-1 is the bankruptcy rate in a given country i at a given year t – 1; RPit-1 refers to a dummy 
variable indicating whether reorganization procedure is legalized (1) or not (0) by the bankruptcy law in 
country i during year t – 1; CTit-1 refers to the average closing time (in years) to complete a bankruptcy 
procedure in country i during year t – 1; CCit-1 refers to the average closing cost (% of estate) of the 
bankruptcy proceedings in country i during year t – 1; RRit-1 refers to the recovery rate (cents on the 
dollar) of bankruptcy filings in country i during year t – 1; SAit-1 refers to a dummy variable indicating 
whether the reorganization procedure allows an automatic stay of assets (1) or otherwise (0) in country i 
during year t – 1; MSit-1 refers to a dummy variable indicating whether the incumbent management is 
allowed to stay (1) or otherwise (0) in country i during year t – 1; PCit-1 refers to a dummy variable 
indicating whether secured creditors are protected thus have the highest priority in payment (1) or 
otherwise in country i during year t – 1; Cit-1 is a vector of control variables (described below) in country i 
during year t – 1; and ε is a log normally distributed error term. By transforming equation (I) to its natural 
logarithm, we obtain the linear equation with a normally distributed error term, µ:  
Log (BRi, t)=α log (BRit-1) + γRPit-1 + ζCTit-1 + ηCCit-1 + θRRit-1 + ιSAit-1 + κMSit-1 + λPCit-1 + µ(II) 8   
 
We use a logarithm transformation to allow our dependent variable (percentage) to take both positive 
and negative values rather than constrained to be positive. This log-linear model is commonly used in 
econometric estimation for percentage changes, and is more consistent with the assumption of normally 




We control for four major factors. First, we control for the previous year’s number of bankruptcies for 
each country. We also expect that economic performance of a country would affect its bankruptcy rate. 
For example, countries experiencing negative growth may have higher rates of bankruptcies. Therefore, 
we control for the country’s general level of development and macroeconomic performance. For general 
development, we include lagged real GDP per capita in US dollars. For economic performance, we 
include the growth rate of real GDP lagged one year obtained from the IMF (Claessens & Klapper, 2005). 
In addition, we control for the number of banks within a country in a given year in order to capture the 
variance and stability of a country’s banking infrastructure (Caprio & Honohan, 1999; Bandiera et al., 
2000). Second, we create dummy variables for regional effects (i.e., South America and Europe) with 
North America as the reference category. Third, we control for possible time effects across all countries. 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) also suggest the need to control for time periods of systemic banking crisis. 
We include a variable measuring years elapsed from 1990 to capture any time trend effects associated 
with changes in the bankruptcy rate (Boeker, 1997; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). Finally, we control for the 
social dimension of bankruptcy law. Not only the formal but also the informal aspect of the institutional 
environment, such as the level of social stigma concerning failure, may have significant impact. In other 
words, the same entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law may have different implications for entrepreneurs 
in different societal environments (Lee et al., 2007; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Shepherd, 2003). For 
measuring the level of social stigma, we include the suicide rate (by year, per 100,000 populations) 
obtained from the WHO. For example, in Japan, where stigma of failure is very high, it is well known that 




We estimate the parameters of equation (II) on unbalanced, pooled, cross-national, time-series data 
with yearly time periods. Since we do not have the same number of years for which we have observations 
on bankruptcy rates for each country, the number of observations varies among countries. Overall, we 
have an unbalanced panel of 276 country-year observations. We use generalized estimating equations 
(GEE)—using the XTGEE command in STATA—to analyze both inter- and intra- variation among 
observations (Liang & Zeger, 1986; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). GEE specifies the relationship between 
the mean and variance of the dependent variable rather than the full distribution of population, as is 





Table 3 presents the GEE estimates on the changes in bankruptcy rates derived from Equation II. 
Model 1 is the base model, containing only the control variables. Model 2 represents the main effects of 
all our key variables. In Model 2, the effect of reorganization procedure is positive and significant, 
therefore supporting Hypothesis 1. The result indicates that the availability of reorganization procedure as 
a choice for bankrupt firms does encourage bankruptcy filings. Both closing time and closing cost exhibit 
positive and significant results, also supporting both Hypotheses 2 and 3. The less time and less costs 
associated with bankruptcy proceeding encourages entrepreneurs to file bankruptcy. Put differently, the 9   
faster the rendering of judgment and the less time spent on the bankruptcy procedure, the greater it 
encourages entrepreneurs to file bankruptcy therefore the higher the filing rate in a country.   
 
[ Insert Table 3 about here ] 
 
The significant and positive effect of fresh start provides support for Hypothesis 4. The result shows 
that the more entrepreneurs recover from bankruptcy—which would mean a fresher start—the higher the 
bankruptcy filing rate in a country. The positive and significant effect of stay of assets supports 
Hypothesis 5. The result indicates that an automatic stay on assets is likely to encourage entrepreneurs to 
file bankruptcy. On the other hand, the significant but a negative effect of stay of incumbent management 
offers contradicting result for Hypothesis 6. The result indicates that allowing incumbent managers to stay 
on the job does not lead to a higher rate of bankruptcy filing; rather, it works the other way around. It is 
the management turnover that actually leads to an increase in bankruptcy filing. Finally, Hypothesis 7 is 
supported by the positive and significant effect of protection of creditors. The result shows that the 




Overall, three contributions emerge. First, we theoretically extend Lee et al.’s (2007) argument that at a 
societal level, an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law can encourage entrepreneurs to take more risks 
such as filing bankruptcy. When risk-taking is encouraged by a more entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy 
law, it can generate variety by increasing the number of firms with high growth potential. This may lead 
to more entrepreneurship and economic development at a societal level. In short, we echo Knott and 
Posen (2005) that failure may be good—for the economy. Second, we empirically substantiate our 
argument through a longitudinal, cross-country database covering 35 countries and spanning ten 
years—to the best of our knowledge, a very first endeavor in the strategy literature. We find that the 
availability of reorganization bankruptcy as a choice for bankrupt firms does encourage more bankruptcy 
filings. Moreover, the less time and less cost associated with the bankruptcy procedure also encourages 
bankruptcy filings. Fresh start for entrepreneurs also increases bankruptcy filings in a country. An 
automatic stay of assets as specified by the bankruptcy law also facilitates bankruptcy filings while a stay 
of incumbent management does not. Finally, secured creditor protection at the time of bankruptcy leads to 
a higher bankruptcy rate. Finally, we strengthen our understanding of how institutional frameworks such 
as bankruptcy law affect strategic choices (Peng, 2003). The majority of past studies on bankruptcy law 
stems from finance and economics, and generally focuses on the efficiency of bankruptcy at the firm level. 
Our work thus joins Knott and Posen (2005) and Lee et al. (2007) in pushing for a more informed 
understanding of how institutions matter—more specifically, how formal institutions governing 
bankruptcy matter for entrepreneurial behavior and outcome.   
 
In general, we find that the less the downside risk involved in filing bankruptcy, the more risk firms are 
taking, and the more bankruptcies they are filing. Curtailing downside losses does appear to be inevitably 
leading more failing entrepreneurs and managers to file bankruptcy. After the passage of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act in the United States in 1979, the number of firms filing bankruptcy doubled, and many took 
advantage of the availability of Chapter 11 reorganization bankruptcy (Weiss, 1990; Wruck, 1990). There 
is no need to spill more ink on the entrepreneurial activities, wealth creation, and economic development 
in post-1979 United States relative to an earlier era. From a policy standpoint, we argue that more 
risk-taking behavior and thus more bankruptcies, especially in the long run, can encourage 
entrepreneurship development at the societal level for sustainable economic development. However, 
while Knott and Posen (2005: 637) suggest that “policies to subsidize entry may enhance social welfare,” 
we advocate a different policy suggestion: make bankruptcy law more entrepreneur-friendly. Specific 
efforts should be directed to (1) make a reorganization bankruptcy option available, (2) reduce the time 
spent on bankruptcy procedure, (3) reduce its cost, (4) allow bankrupt entrepreneurs to have a fresh start, 10   
(5) provide an opportunity to have automatic stay of assets, and (6) protect creditors. We are less certain 
about whether it is advisable to provide managers the opportunity to stay on the job. This stipulation may 
only promise managers to stay on the job while the firm goes through bankruptcy procedures, and they 
may still be fired after the firm successfully restructures. This may not give enough incentive for the 
managers, since saving the firm would not save them in the long run. One other scenario is that more 
capable managers may have moved elsewhere and only managers with little capabilities end up staying, 
which again makes it harder for them to stay with the firm when it recovers. Clearly, more research is 




As a first step toward a better understanding of how institutions play a key role in determining the 
risk-taking behavior of entrepreneurs, we have barely scratched the surface of this intriguing 
entrepreneurial phenomenon at the societal level. Nevertheless, we have utilized the real options 
perspective to map out how an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law can encourage risk-taking behaviors 
and stimulate entrepreneurship development around the world. In short, “no pain, no gain.” A society that 
is not willing to absorb the “pain” of having a large number of entrepreneurial failures, via a entrepreneur- 
friendly bankruptcy law, is not likely to reap the “gain” of vibrant entrepreneurship development and 
economic growth at a societal level. Given the pervasiveness of corporate bankruptcies in the world 
economy, if strategy research on institutions and entrepreneurship is to keep up with practice, it seems 
imperative that our attention be devoted to this important, relevant, and challenging research agenda.     
 
CONTACT: Yasuhiro Yamakawa; yxy052100@utdallas.edu; (T) 972-883-4469; School of Management, 
University of Texas at Dallas, 2601 N. Floyd Rd., Richardson, TX 75080 
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TABLE 1 
How Bankruptcy Law Differs Around the World 
















Stay of Assets 
1: Stay 










Argentina  1  2.8  14.0  65.1  1 1 1 
Australia  1  1.0  8.0  20.0  1 1 1 
Austria  1  1.1  18.0  26.6  0 1 1 
Belgium  1  0.9  4.0  13.3  0 1 1 
Canada  1  0.8 4.0 9.9  1  1  1 
Chile  1  5.6  14.0  76.9  1 1 1 
Colombia  1  3.0  1.0  44.8  1 1 0 
CzechRepublic 1  9.2  14.0  82.1  N/A N/A N/A 
Denmark  1  3.3  9.0  37.0  0 1 1 
Finland  0  0.9  4.0  10.9  1 1 1 
France  1  1.9  9.0  52.3  1 1 0 
Germany  1  1.2  8.0  47.0  0 1 1 
Greece  1  2.0  9.0  54.0  1 0 0 
Hong  Kong  1  1.1  9.0  18.8  0 0 1 
Hungary 1  2.0  14.0  64.2  N/A N/A N/A 
Ireland  1  0.4  9.0  12.0  1 1 1 
Italy  1  1.2  22.0  60.0  1 1 1 
Japan  1  0.6 4.0 7.3  1  0  1 
Netherlands  1  1.7  1.0  13.3  1 1 1 
New  Zealand  0  2.0  4.0  29.0  0 0 0 
Norway  1  0.9 1.0 8.9  1  1  1 
Peru  1  3.1  7.0  68.6  1 1 0 
Poland 1  1.4  22.0  36.0  N/A N/A N/A 
Portugal  1  2.0  9.0  25.3  1 1 1 
Russia 1  3.8  9.0  72.4  N/A N/A N/A 
Singapore  1  0.8 1.0 8.6  0  0  1 
South Africa  1  2.0  18.0  66.0  1 0 1 
South  Korea  1  1.5  4.0  18.3  0 0 1 
Spain  1  1.0  14.0  22.1  0 1 1 
Sweden  1  2.0  9.0  25.1  1 1 1 
Switzerland  1  3.0  4.0  53.1  1 1 1 
Thailand  1  2.7  36.0  56.0  0 0 1 
Turkey  1  5.9  7.0  92.8  1 1 1 
UnitedKingdom  1  1.0  6.0  14.7  0 0 1 
United States  1  2.0  7.0  23.7  1 1 1 
Source     
Claessens and Klapper, 2002, 2005 
Doing Business Report 2006 
La Porta et al., 1998 14   
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients – 35 Countries, 1990-1999 (N = 211 Country-Years) 
                                                                           
Variable Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14 
1. Log (Lagged Bankruptcy 
Rate) 
-.25 1.65  -4.61  2.45               
2. GDP/Cap (t-1)  15909.84 9842.22  1452.44 37202.48 .47***               
3. GDP Growth (t-1)  3.19 3.48  -10.51  12.82  -.20***  -.14**              
4. Number of Banks  697.31 2056.51  9  10500 .19***  .35*** -.05             
5. S. American Countries  .11 .31  0  1  -.38***  -.42***  .26***  -.10*            
6. European Countries  .57 .50  0  1  .16**  .23***  -.32***  -.14**  -.40***           
7. Years Since 1990  4.61  2.68  0  9  .02 .02 .06  .005  .12**  -.13**         
8. Suicide Rate  14.50 7.28  .50 41.50  .42***  .21***  -.45***  -.04  -.31***  .32***  .03         
9. Reorganization 
Procedure 
.95  .23  0  1 -.24***  -.01 .08 .08 .08 -.02  .001  -.28***       
10. Closing Time  -1.99  1.54  -9.20  -.40  .15**  .41*** -.04  .04 -.42*** .11*  -.05  -.03  -.10*       
11. Closing Cost  -9.71 7.56  -36  -1  .32***  .50***  -.01  .09 -.02 .02 .08  .17**  -.18***  .21***      
12. Fresh Start  35.24 23.29  7.30 92.80  -.22***  -.59***  -.04  -.09 .47***  -.11*  .02  .04 .18***  -.76***  -.49***     
13. Stay of Assets  .63  .48  0  1  .16** .05 -.11 .09  .28***  -.05 -.03 -.05 .02  -.19***  .17***  .22***     
14. Stay of Incumbent       
Management 
.71  .45  0  1  .12*  .19*** -.14** .18*** .23*** .47*** .01 .24*** .06 -.16***  .13**  .07 .36***   
15. Protection of Creditors  .87  .33  0  1  .09 .28*** .02  .10 -.30*** .07  -.02  .07 .21***  .17***  -.14**  -.30***  -.14** .07 
 
Note. t denotes current year.   




   
TABLE 3 
GEE Estimates of Bankruptcy Rate – 35 Countries, 1990-1999 (N=179 Country-Years)   
               
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Hypothesis 
Testing 
Log (Lagged Bankruptcy Rate)  0.925*** 0.964***   
  (0.023) (0.009)   
GDP/Cap (t-1)  0.0000008  -0.00001***   
  (0.000) (0.000)   
GDP Growth (t-1)  -0.010 -0.0002   
  (0.009) (0.005)   
Number of Banks  -0.000004  0.000007*   
  (0.000) (0.000)   
South American Countries  -0.130 -0.121   
  (0.117) (0.111)   
European Countries  -0.033 0.014   
  (0.061) (0.034)   
Years Since 1990  -0.015**  -0.003  
  (0.007) (0.007)   
Suicide Rate (t-1)  0.005  0.015***   
  (0.004) (0.004)   
Reorganization Procedure (H1)    0.220***  Supported 
   (0.074)  
Closing Time (H2)    0.042**  Supported 
   (0.018)  
Closing Cost (H3)    0.009***  Supported 
   (0.002)  
Fresh Start (H4)    0.003***  Supported 
   (0.001)  
Stay of Assets (H5)    0.057**  Supported 
   (0.027)  
Stay of Incumbent Management (H6)    -0.100**  Not supported 
   (0.044)  
Protection of Creditors (H7)    0.147***  Supported 
   (0.052)   
      
Constant  0.098 -0.168   
  (0.112) (0.118)   
Wald Chi-square  4352.68*** 230195.35***   
D.f.   8 15     
Note. Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses; t denotes current year.   
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
1   5   
 